Across the backend of 2025, two parallel tracks of rumors about aircraft carriers ran through Chinese-language military watchers on social media. The first was that China was building a nuclear aircraft carrier in Dalian. The second was that China was building another conventional aircraft carrier at the Jiangnan Shipyard in Shanghai.
That first rumor about the nuclear carrier has now been effectively verified by satellite imagery. But there is no such confirmation of a new conventional carrier. So why are people convinced it’s coming?
In November, China commissioned its latest aircraft carrier, the Type 003 Fujian. The Fujian is substantially larger and more capable than its two predecessors, the Russian-built Type 001 Liaoning and the Chinese-built Type 002 Shandong. The Shandong is visually almost identical to the Liaoning, and NATO considers both to be members of the Kuznetsov class. Both carriers have a ski jump to assist take-offs and arresting gear to assist landings, making them short takeoff but arrested recovery, or STOBAR, carriers.
In contrast, the Fujian is a catapult-assisted take-off but arrested recovery, or CATOBAR, carrier. The catapults allow it to carry other kinds of aircraft in addition to fighter jets, including early warning aircraft that substantially increase the effective power of its airwing. The Fujian also carries China’s new fifth-generation fighter, the J-35 Blue Shark, as well as the older J-15 Flying Shark fighter. The Shandong and Liaoning only carry the J-15, although it appears that the J-35 is STOBAR-capable. The Shandong was built in Dalian. The Fujian was built at Jiangnan Shipyard in Shanghai.
China watchers identified in February 2025 that something large was being built at Dalian. It had been rumored for a long time that China would follow the U.S.’s example and switch to building nuclear aircraft carriers. The new hull being laid down was seen as possibly being that rumored new class of carrier, the Type 004. Later in 2025, satellite imagery emerged that showed the new vessel was being built with two large square containment structures deep within its hull. The War Zone identified these as reactor containment structures.
It’s now broadly accepted that this ship is indeed a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. Based on the dimensions that are already apparent, it will be substantially larger than the conventional Type 003 Fujian. The Type 004 is still often referred to in English as China’s fourth carrier. But in Chinese discourse, that is far less obvious.
Chinese analysts and observers believe that spot could be taken by a ship they are calling the Type 003A, an evolved class that is very similar to the Fujian. The Type 003A would theoretically address some of the issues that a first-in-class ship like the Fujian typically experiences.
There are two main reasons to think that the Type 003A is coming. But there is also a pretty glaring reason that it might not be.
China’s navy is expanding fast. Its carrier fleet is, too: In 2018, it only had one carrier under commission, and now it has three. But if the Type 004 is the next in line, that expansion may slow dramatically. Building a country’s first large nuclear-powered ship is no small matter and will likely take time in itself. But beyond this, if China intends to build more carriers, it is plausible that it will wait until the Type 004 has been shown to be effective, or at least not have significant design flaws.
The U.S. commissioned its first nuclear carrier, the Enterprise, in 1961. It didn’t commission its second, the Nimitz, until 14 years later. In the intervening years, two more conventional carriers were commissioned (a third was commissioned only a month ahead of the Enterprise).
If China intends to use its carriers in combat in the Western Pacific, which is a reasonable assumption, it would likely prefer to have more than four sooner rather than later. Until late last year, the U.S.’s public assessment was that China was aiming for six carriers by 2035. But the 2025 “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” dropped a bombshell: It updated the assessment to nine carriers by 2035. That effectively means that China would have to build six more carriers, at a rate of more than one every two years.
Working out exactly how realistic that is involves making a lot of assumptions and is left as an exercise for the reader. But it should be patently obvious that anything near to it could only be achieved if multiple production lines are running at the same time. And given a reasonable expectation of delays or just scheduled slowness in the nuclear program, building more conventional carriers in the interim is an obvious solution.
There is some visual evidence that China is planning to build a Type 003A. The first piece of the puzzle is a building in Wuhan. This huge flat-top structure, in the shape of a carrier, has been used by China to practice deck operations for its carriers before they are launched. When the Fujian was under construction, the building in Wuhan was substantially enlarged to match it, whereas before it had imitated the Shandong and Liaoning.
Now, satellite and terrestrial photography shows that the carrier-shaped building in Wuhan has been enlarged again. The War Zone suggested that its new configuration matches that of the Type 004. The island superstructure that contains the bridge, control tower and radar has been reconstructed further to the rear. But pictures of the island have revealed something fascinating: It still has the kind of smoke stack that you would expect to see on a conventional carrier and not a nuclear carrier, which doesn’t produce exhaust fumes. But although the tower is visually very similar to the Fujian’s, it is not identical: The smoke stack has been moved away from the rest of the tower.
This has led Chinese analysts on X like Hurin to the conclusion that while the Wuhan set-up is being configured to test deckhandling procedures for the new, larger Type 004, the tower is simultaneously testing a new configuration for the Type 003A. One account that shares many updates about the Type 003A suggested that the proximity of the smoke stack and its exhaust to other systems on the Fujian might be causing issues.
Photos of ship models have emerged on Chinese social media that show a labeled Type 003A carrier with exactly the same tower-and-smoke stack layout as at Wuhan. However, these photos are unverified.
All of this, and perhaps more that is unvoiced, has left many in these Chinese spaces convinced that the Type 003A is real and is coming. However, there is one problem. Despite many saying China is building the carrier, satellite imagery of the Jiangnan Shipyard, where the Fujian was constructed, does not show any plausible candidate for the Type 003A, though some analysts have argued they can see signs of preparations.
Until such imagery emerges, all of this analysis should be viewed as, at best, of what might be, not of what is.
What is happening at Wuhan with the tower, and the way it is explained to support the existence of the Type 003A, is also not completely logical. Wouldn’t it make more sense to just build a Type 003A tower literally anywhere else so the Type 004 tower could be tested properly? Furthermore, the position of the tower at Wuhan matches neither of the tower positions for the Type 004 nor the Type 003A models that have emerged.
Fundamentally however, the argument that China won’t be able to continue to rapidly expand its carrier fleet unless it builds more conventional carriers is compelling. Although they are overall somewhat less powerful than nuclear carriers, they are perfectly serviceable. The U.S. kept some of its conventional carriers in service well into the 2000s, in order to keep total carrier numbers at the 12 that was legally mandated at the time (since lowered to 11).
It’s possible that China intends to operate a much smaller fleet or to build it up much more slowly. But that being true challenges many other assumptions and assessments.
Either way, the current unclear situation cannot persist for a great length of time. If China doesn’t start building a Type 003A soon, the entire argument falls apart. For now though, the Type 003A exists in limbo, both real and imagined, alive and dead.
A Schrodinger’s CATOBAR, if you will.
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