At the end of last month, the extension of invitations for Saudi Arabia, Iran, Ethiopia, Egypt, Argentina and the United Arab Emirates to join the BRICS group of countries was greeted by some as the latest attempt by China to raise its political and economic standing in the Middle East. Four of the potential new recruits are from the region, and the point is that this and other recent formalizations of relations can be seen as a “significant development for China as it seeks to translate its economic clout into tangible regional political support for its global ambitions,” according to analysts at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
However, there remain two key reasons why it would be a mistake to categorize this, or indeed any of the recent Middle Eastern interactions with China, as any kind of sudden lunge toward a hypothetical pro-China camp.
In the first instance, there’s nothing sudden about what’s happening. It’s a “renewed focus” brought on by several structural shifts, explains Chuchu Zhang (張楚楚), associate professor at Fudan University’s School of International Relations and Public Affairs. Speaking at an online event hosted by Chatham House, she says the U.S. is implementing a “strategic contraction” in the region after wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that has offered additional room for China. At the same time, as Washington has sought to contain China, its relations with Western countries have become weaker, which has produced a renewed emphasis on working with developing countries. Add in that energy producers in the region also have great strategic importance to China and you get a steady uptick in interest.
The view that this is something that has grown over time is shared by Dawn Murphy, associate professor of national security strategy at the National War College, speaking at the same event. “I see it very much as a linear progression, from about 1990 forward,” she says, before adding extra detail to what China wants from these connections: “What’s driving China’s presence in the region is access to resources as well as markets for Chinese businesses, wanting to have support from the countries in this region in international forums and other international interactions, and then also wanting to have relative silence from countries in this region on issues such as Xinjiang or Hong Kong or other issues.” She adds that COVID means some interaction now looks like an increase but is really a resumption.
The second reason the idea of a pro-China shift should at least be treated with caution is that what is happening is not a grand strategic partnership. Rather, the relationships are transactional, and the emphasis on the part of the Middle Eastern countries involved is on carving out room for multilateralism, not choosing China.
“Interest in the region by China enhances the importance of the region,” says Ahmed Aboudouh, associate fellow at Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa program. He says that, broadly speaking, from the Middle Eastern perspective, the idea is that China acts as an “interest multiplier.” That means these countries don’t want to be the battlefield of great power competition, they want instead to maximize “opportunities” from both the U.S. and China while maintaining “strategic autonomy.”
Within that strategy, admittedly, there are several elements of dealing with China that suit these countries. China’s policies of “non-interference, great respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, economic integration at the regional level and peaceful development” are all valued, Aboudouh says. And the fact that many of the Middle Eastern countries looking to work with China are themselves authoritarian means that they are more than happy not to talk about human rights issues.
But these do not mean a zero-sum game in which the U.S. is excluded. Simultaneous interaction, in fact, may be much of the point for China. Zhang, Aboudouh and Murphy all suggest that China wants connections to Middle Eastern countries that are allies of the U.S. because it makes it harder to cut China out of the international system. “Common interests between China and U.S allies,” as Zhang puts it, protect China’s position.
There are risks for China as well as opportunities, though. On top of increasing market cooperation and links through international groupings like BRICS, it wants to “play more and more of a role of mediator” in the Middle East, Murphy says. In what was judged a PR success for China, this has already occurred in the case of the detente between Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, involvement in conflicts is a more fraught business than trade, with greater responsibility if resolutions aren’t found, possible resistance from Washington and wariness tending to grow as influence grows.
On the second of those issues, Washington has made clear it won’t allow China to “fill the vacuum” its strategic contraction is leaving behind, says Zhang, and it is putting up hurdles to Chinese presence. It is reportedly planning to build a railway between the Persian Gulf and Arab countries that is also linked to India, and it is building I2U2, a new alliance between India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and the United States. On the final issue, Zhang explains that China is “caught in a dilemma” as it seeks to expand its role. Smaller levels of influence with a “hands off” approach make it easy for China to be “friends with everyone” and distinguish itself from the West, but as its influence grows it will need to persuade people that its influence and power projection are different from large Western powers. This may not be easy.
Despite these potential challenges, though, there is seemingly not as much overt pessimism around the idea of the Middle East maintaining a balance between the U.S. and China as in other regions and groupings. In notable contrast to those recently lamenting the difficulties the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Aboudouh mentions the potential challenge of the U.S. asking for reduced ties with China in exchange for security guarantees, but it doesn’t hang over every other discussion point.
The difference might come from the fact that, for the moment, China and the U.S. are interested in “asymmetric” involvements in the Middle East — and this mostly suits both them and the various Middle Eastern leaderships. Aside from in the UAE, China isn’t emphasizing building military bases — ”Apart from maybe [in] countries considered [U.S.] enemies like Iran or Syria” — or offering robust security guarantees, Aboudouh says, which means it doesn’t challenge the U.S. role as external security guarantor. At the same time, Middle Eastern countries don’t want to “move out” the U.S and “don’t trust” China as a security guarantor. Thus, as long as China doesn’t drift further into military involvement, the risk of friction is seen as low.
A final point to add. Whisper it, but perhaps unlike elsewhere, there are even a series of shared interests in the region for China and the U.S. Murphy points out that they both value the stability of flow of oil, keeping the oil price down, regional stability and the eradication of terrorism. In other words, in a number of ways, transactional multilateralism seems to be working for all sides, right now. Or, at least, the leaderships of all sides — no-one is voting on any of this stuff, after all.
Image: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China
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