As the BRICS grouping of countries added six new members last week, there was some question about why Indonesia, which on paper has similarities with other large developing economies that have joined, chose not to follow. In response to this, South Africa’s ambassador to BRICS said Indonesia had asked for a delay to consult with its Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) counterparts over the decision.
At the same time as those structural shifts were (not) taking place, so was a dispute between China and the Philippines over the Ayungin Shoal in the South China Sea. Here, as China has unsuccessfully attempted to block a supply mission to a Philippine navy vessel intentionally stranded on the shoal, many have noted that ASEAN has remained conspicuously quiet.
Together, these issues highlight doubts about the role of ASEAN. Made up of countries that lean toward both the U.S. and China, it’s an uneasy fit in a world with increasing tension and competition between those powers — and it has, in the eyes of some, appeared to become locked into the role of a background player.
“[ASEAN] doesn’t want to choose between [the] U.S. and China, doesn’t want to become an arena for rivalry, doesn’t want to get dragged into the proxy conflict … of this geopolitical rivalry,” says Rizal Sukma, a Senior Fellow at Centre for Strategic and International Studies, speaking at a recent panel discussion hosted by the Centre on Asia and Globalisation (CAG). “[It wants instead] to retain its autonomy, to shape regional economic and security architecture, uphold the rules based regional architecture, and also be an honest broker within the starting environment of competing interests among the great powers.”
The problem is that each of these goals appears unattainable under current geopolitical circumstances, where non-alignment is being squeezed.
“It is increasingly difficult to maintain a non-aligned position [for] ASEAN, [as an] ASEAN member state. ASEAN might have to choose,” Sukma says. And as for being an honest broker: “It doesn’t say anything [about] what happened in the Ayungin Shoal. ASEAN has not even mentioned it. Not even calling for restraint. Not even call[ing] for calm.” Thus, it’s become somewhat stranded.
More generous takes do exist. As a “hub of regional multilateralism,” ASEAN still has the ability to “facilitate meetings on the sidelines” and offers decisions by major powers legitimacy by demonstrating engagement with a “committee of marginalised countries,” according to Sarah Teo, an assistant professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) speaking at the same event. She points to the 2019 adoption of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific regional architecture initiative (AOIP) as an “attempt to reclaim centrality in the region” and notes that the U.K.’s recent application to be ASEAN’s latest dialogue partner is recognition of the value it still offers.
However, challenges are arriving from within and without.
Internally, there are fractures on key issues, such as the coup in Myanmar, leading some to suggest that ASEAN’s unanimous decision-making process needs to be scrapped in order to get more done. Moe Thuzar, a senior Fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute also speaking at the CAG event, points out that this year’s State of Southeast Asia survey found that over 80% of respondents were concerned ASEAN is slow and ineffective, and unable to cope with political and economic developments. Additionally, over 70% were concerned it was becoming an arena for major power competition. And over 60% worried about ASEAN disunity.
Externally, the U.S. decision to send Vice President Kamala Harris to the upcoming ASEAN summit in Indonesia this month could be seen as a signal that the grouping is not a priority forum through which to engage for the U.S. “What is worrying is not just this one incident … I think you can see that there has been a frequent downgrading of delegations from the US.,” Thuzar says. She notes that similar downgrades have also taken place under former presidents George Bush and Donald Trump. “Biden was supposed to reverse the Trump lack of engagement, but this hasn’t happened.”
Taken as a whole, these leave ASEAN looking toothless. Both Sukma and Teo agree that it has no real capacity to act as a “buffer” between the U.S. and China, and Teo says there is a “missing dimension of crisis management or resolution” with regards to Myanmar.
If that toothlessness is real, though, it’s important to note that none of this affects what Sukma calls its “most important” achievement. Its “main function is to ensure good and peaceful relationships among the member states,” he says, adding that “none of the member states would ever think that they need to resort to war in order to resolve problems or differences among member states.”
Ultimately, Sukma’s solution to external problems is that members can act outside ASEAN as well as in. “For dealing with, say, threat A and B, ASEAN might be useful. Say trafficking and other transnational crimes,” he explains. But “when it comes to traditional security challenges … military alliance building, military buildup … international relations doesn’t have to be a monolith … . Do not expect that ASEAN will deliver everything that you need.”
In other words, as Teo puts it, in a world of great power competition ”we should approach the ASEAN as what it is, rather than what we hope it will be.”
Image: ASEAN Indonesia 2023
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