In the wake of the U.S. Congress passing the “Strengthening the Quad Act” last month, one of the most striking things about the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad) remains true. While a lot of people are clear on what it isn’t — a military alliance — there is not quite a definitive answer on what it is. This leaves room for questions over its role in any potential conflict over the Taiwan Strait.
Described variously as “a loose grouping rather than a formal alliance,” a “meeting format,” an “informal framework for consultation,” a “diplomatic dialogue,” and a “diplomatic alliance” between India, Japan, Australia and the United States, what is widely agreed upon is the idea that the Quad’s return in 2017 came about as a part of an attempt to “strategically balance” against the influence of China in the Indo-Pacific region. However, the mechanisms through which it provides that balancing act remain a source of disagreement.
Currently, annual leaders’ meetings and regular foreign ministers’ meetings take place and are followed by statements on shared aims. But the countries involved see the institution differently. “In Washington or Delhi there are very different views of what the Quad is and we’ve seen the Quad evolve accordingly,” said Stephen Nagy, an associated research fellow at Institute for Security and Development, at a forum event last month. “They’re not harmonized on many activities, especially on the security front, and they may be better placed to deal with public good provision.”
Different Priorities
That split primarily refers to India’s reluctance to discuss security issues within the group, out of commitment to non-alignment, and to not antagonizing China. Beijing has referred to the Quad as an “Asian NATO” alongside various other strongly worded statements, and many believe that plays a role in India’s reticence on security.
“This kind of rhetoric is mostly intended to alarm non-Quad countries in the region and send a strong message of disapproval from Beijing,” Bates Gill, executive director at the Center for China Analysis, told Domino Theory by email. “That said, concerns over China’s negative reactions have often been a factor for non-U.S. Quad members urging restraint on the organization’s activities, particularly in the security realm. In this sense, it is probably fair to say that worries about China’s reaction has helped steer the Quad away from a strictly security-oriented body and encouraged it to deepen cooperation across a range of other areas, including development assistance, clean energy, climate resilience, public health, and maritime domain awareness, to name a few.”
The Future Regarding Taiwan
From this starting point, there are divergent views on what kind of response to a hypothetical conflict over the Taiwan Strait the Quad can realistically be expected to generate.
For some experts, the logic of interconnected economies is enough to justify calls to develop “concrete strategic synergy and defense cooperation with Taiwan.” From others, there have even been direct calls for the Quad to “let Taiwan and the Quad fight side by side.”
Speaking more cautiously, Stephen Nagy agreed that Quad members could not “stick their head in the sand” over Taiwan. “With regards to Taiwan, I think we should be very clear,” he said in response to a question posed by Domino Theory. “Whether it’s India, whether it’s Southeast Asia, whether it’s Japan or whether it’s South Korea, Taiwan plays a major part in the region’s economy. In India it’s a big supplier of FDI [foreign direct investment] and as a result I just don’t think India or Southeast Asia can stick their head in the sand and not have a position if there was some kind of conflict across the Taiwan Strait. They have economic interests and … these shared interests are the framework for how they should focus on cooperation.”
There are many, though, who see the Quad as a dead end with regard to anything close to military cooperation. Because the Quad is not a military alliance.
“We should not be under any illusions about what the Quad could actually achieve in response to aggressive PRC [People’s Republic of China] activities [in the South China Sea and across the Taiwan Strait] beyond rhetorical or diplomatic condemnation,” Bates Gill told Domino Theory, adding separately that “interoperability between Indian forces and their counterparts in Australia, Japan, and the United States would be very difficult if not impossible to achieve under current circumstances.”
Ultimately, for Bates, “Real military responses to China — if indeed it comes to that — will not emanate from the Quad. Rather, it would come from the United States and the U.S. system of alliances and security partners. In the end, the Quad is simply not a military alliance.”
Conclusion
Can these positions be reconciled?
An essay written by Daleep Singh, published days before he returned to the White House as deputy national security adviser for international economics, hints at how they might be.
“There are … major geostrategic opportunities for the United States and its allies to attract nonaligned countries into its orbit with positive inducements, and in doing so to gradually isolate China before any conflict unfolds,” Singh outlined, and specifically namechecked India as a potential partner in the endeavor.
In this view of things, the Quad doesn’t need to offer military cooperation to be a factor in calculations around Taiwan. Its existence as a connection point between the U.S. and India alone could be seen as a major act of “cooperation” in isolating China. If that’s the case, Brendan Cannon, assistant professor of international security at Khalifa University’s description of the Quad’s role may be useful. “It is a security grouping,” he said. “But it lives by the adage of ‘speak softly and carry a big stick.’” That stick is the geopolitical isolation of China, with nonaligned India as a key pillar in making it happen.
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