The tumultuous relationship between Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is marked by frequent purges, recurring reforms and persistent expressions of distrust. Simultaneously, Xi advances military modernization and assigns the military a role in foreign policy not seen for decades. This dual approach intensifies the tension between military professionalism and political loyalty, reaching levels not seen since the Mao era.
But Xi’s lack of trust in the PLA raises concerns about its effectiveness in crisis. Launching a war would also give PLA leaders greater political influence, a situation Xi might be reluctant to accept. What does this indicate about China’s military modernization and recent assertiveness?
A possible explanation is that China’s recent incendiary rhetoric and frequent yet limited use of the PLA does not necessarily signal a reckless use of force. Rather, it may reflect a strategy to deter adversaries without engaging in full-scale warfare, while concurrently placating the PLA.
Xi’s complex relationship with the military has been especially chaotic throughout 2023-24. In March 2023, former defense minister Wei Fenghe (魏鳳和), who previously commanded the Rocket Force, vanished from public view. A few months later, the defense minister at the time, Li Shangfu (李尚福), who had headed the Central Military Commission’s Equipment Development Department, also disappeared, only to be officially removed in October. Both were expelled from the Chinese Communist Party in June 2024.
In December 2023, nine generals were ousted from the top legislature, including General Ju Qiansheng (巨乾生), commander of the PLA’s Strategic Support Force, and three aerospace executives from China’s military-industrial complex who were purged. They are not alone — more senior cadres, many linked to the PLA’s pivotal Rocket Force and the military-industrial complex, had also been purged during this period.
In addition, organizational reforms initiated by Xi just eight years earlier have been partially revised. The replacement of established bodies has altered the PLA’s command structure and its lines of subordination to the Central Military Commission and Xi himself. Notably, the Strategic Support Force, formed in December 2015 to oversee aerospace and cyber units, was dissolved in early 2024.
Any belief that these moves stabilized the Party’s relationship with the military was disproved by the June 2024 Military Political Work Conference that was held for the first time in a decade. Symbolically, it was held in Yan’an, the historic revolutionary base. Expressing deep dissatisfaction with the PLA’s conduct, Xi emphasized the need for a strong, loyal, corruption-free and capable military under Party guidelines and supervision. He stressed ideological transformation, strict anti-corruption measures and the revitalization of the PLA’s commissar system. Xi also underscored the importance of learning from historical roots, urging PLA commanders to visit the PLA’s Civil War-era headquarters.
These measures collectively reflect Xi’s distrust of the PLA, both politically and operationally, despite its impressive progress over the last two decades. Since the 1980s, and especially in the past 25 years, the PLA’s budget has skyrocketed. This has enabled extensive modernization in nearly every area, including weaponry, command and control, doctrine and training. Recent purges may further advance the PLA’s modernization by removing unprofessional and corrupt officers.
But the PLA is likely not as formidable as China would like others to believe. Xi’s rule of fear, extensive political activities within PLA units, and pervasive corruption across the armed forces and the defense industry offset much of the positive impact of modernization measures. The revival of dual leadership with political commissars further diminishes any benefits.
These factors create widespread paralysis, inefficiency, the promotion of unqualified commanders, insufficient training and other maladies reminiscent of the Mao era, which reforms since the late 1970s have attempted to address. The Ukraine War provides a pertinent context for understanding these sources of weakness. Observing the conflict, Xi might recognize the risks and costs associated with large-scale military operations.
Unwilling to compromise on China’s — and his own — image of strength, Xi aims to cultivate such a reputation without engaging in significant military conflicts that could expose weaknesses and result in substantial losses. Instead of outright military action, he emphasizes deterrence, particularly regarding Taiwan. By sounding the drumbeats of war and emphasizing military readiness, Xi seeks to deter any adversary from challenging China’s red lines.
This approach not only strengthens China’s assertive posture but also mitigates the risks associated with full-scale warfare. Simultaneously, it provides the PLA with a sense of purpose and mission, ideally minimizing the risk of political interference. The crucial question remains whether Xi’s China can maintain control over these escalation dynamics.
Yoram Evron is an Associate Professor of Chinese Studies and Political Science at the University of Haifa. He is co-author of The Fourth Industrial Revolution and Military-Civil Fusion: A New Paradigm for Military Innovation.
This article is republished from East Asia Forum under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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