The Democrats’ midterm stomping of Trump has been called everything from a “blue wave” to “an extinction level event” for the Republicans. The nation’s repudiation of Trump was driven by a number of factors— chief among these the economy, corruption and the Iran War — but virtually no public commentary focused on U.S.-Taiwan relations.
Long annoyed at being treated like a side issue, and therefore seeking to bolster her nation’s standing with international partners, President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) often described Taiwan as holding down the “frontline” in a regional struggle between allied democracies and China’s surging imperial ambitions. Echoing his predecessor, President Lai Ching-te (賴清德) used his inaugural address to celebrate “Taiwan’s democratic vitality as a force for good” and the nation’s role as “a frontline guardian of world peace.” It’s an image that positions Taiwan at the center of debates about the future of democracy in the Indo-Pacific, yet the midterm elections show once again that most American voters are driven by domestic issues. To the extent that voters thought about the world by opposing the war in Iran, their anger was not about the intricacies of geopolitics but about the war’s impact on gas prices. The blue wave may have begun the sweeping away of Trumpism, yet few Americans voted with any sense of Taiwan’s precarious frontline status.
America’s electoral earthquake offers an opportunity for asking: Where will U.S.-Taiwan relations head once the Democrats assume power in Washington?
The first key factor will remain the Trump White House. Despite the president’s well-documented courtship of Xi Jinping (習近平) and his negative rhetoric on Taiwan, Trump is still surrounded by China hawks, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby and more. Countering the president’s disinterest in traditional allies and his general recklessness, realists in Taiwan and America have to hope that these hardline figures within the White House check the president’s drifting too close to Beijing or away from Taipei.
Moving forward, the fate of the still-paused $14-billion arms package for Taiwan will serve as a crucial measuring stick. Releasing the weapons will show a White House supporting an old ally despite Chinese threats; holding the deal in limbo will show a president inclined to please Beijing by sidelining Taipei. Perhaps most importantly, bipartisan voices are clamoring for a massive resuscitation of America’s defense industrial base, which has fallen behind on orders due to the expenditure of weapons in the wars in Ukraine and Iran. As foreign military aid is also a form of domestic welfare for the arms industry, Trump may find himself getting pressured to move forward with the arms package, less for Taiwan’s defense than as a much-needed investment at home.
Trump’s handling of Taiwan will also be impacted by what most observers believe is going to be post-election bloodletting in the administration. By sacking White House Chief of Staff Susie Wiles and replacing her with Stephen Miller, it seems reasonable to assume the Oval Office will be less inclined to appease Xi and more likely to pursue hardline anti-China stances. Fired by a devout sense of America First principles, Miller is likely to push policies that will not be pro-Taiwan so much as combatively anti-communist. As the Nvidia scandal metastasizes, it, too, is likely to empower the administration’s hawks. After the election, as before it, Trump will remain a dangerous and unpredictable variable.
The second key factor for the next two years will remain the Department of Defense. Republican Congressman Thomas Massie sought the impeachment of Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth in November, with the motion falling seven votes short. The Democrats are likely to revive this strategy when they assume control of the Congress in January. For critics of the Trump administration, Hegseth will stand as a convenient scapegoat for the White House’s disastrous foreign policy in general and the quagmire in Iran in particular. Regardless of Hegseth’s contested leadership at the Pentagon, and despite his calamitous misjudgments in the Middle East, he has been a strong advocate for Taiwan. The secretary’s speech at the Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore in 2025, for example, stands among the strongest, most unequivocal statements of U.S. support for Taiwan. Hegseth’s impeachment might satisfy his critics, but it would deprive Taiwan of a strong and vocal ally.
Regardless of Hegseth’s status, the Defense Department has long been critical of China’s aggrandizing behavior and is eager to reassert U.S. primacy in the Indo-Pacific. Admiral Samuel Paparo, head of the United States’ Pacific Command, revealed in an interview with Josh Rogin in The Washington Post that in the event of a Chinese invasion, the United States plans “to turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape” by deploying waves of drones. No “strategic ambiguity” there, Paparo stated publicly what everyone (with the exception of the president!) knows: When the shooting starts, America is coming to Taiwan’s defense.
Hegseth’s Shangri-la speech and Paparo’s comments reflect a bipartisan consensus that China’s imperial ambitions pose an existential threat to Taiwan and allied democracies in the region. Whether you consider such studies as “Stopping an Invasion of Taiwan,” “The Chinese Invasion Threat,” “War with China,” or the annual Report to Congress produced by the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission, experts agree China’s rapid military build-up is a red-lights-flashing warning sign. Across this literature, most military professionals and scholars agree that the gap between Beijing’s annual military budget (estimated at anywhere between $260 billion in 2020 up to $700 billion in 2025) and Taiwan’s military spending ($11.4 billion that same year) foreshadows disaster for Taipei.
These long-standing military factors transcend America’s political parties and the nation’s ever-swinging elections. The key question is whether the Democrats’ new super majority in Congress will translate into their listening to the military brass to fund immediate needs while still working toward peace.
The third key factor for the next two years hinges on how the new Democrats will govern. While the blue wave was driven by kitchen-table issues mixed with revulsion at the corruption in Trumpworld — Taiwan was not an issue — the election nonetheless bodes well for Taiwan for four reasons.
One, the Democrats will be sending to Washington an impressive new team of legislators with deep military experience and international affairs acumen. Colorado’s 4th Congressional District has elected Eileen Laubacher, who retired from the Navy as a rear admiral after 34 years of service, including working in President Biden’s National Security Council. South Carolina’s 1st Congressional District has elected Nancy Lacore, who retired from the Navy as a three-star admiral. The Senate will seat one new member with military experience, Josh Turek, who will join an already strong team, including Senator Tammy Duckworth, an Iraq War veteran who has led multiple congressional delegations to Taiwan, and Senator Jack Reed, a retired Army major in line to be chair of the Armed Services Committee. The voters want lower gas prices and affordable health care, but they may be getting the best team of Democratic veterans Congress has seen in decades.
Two, under the banner of “draining the swamp” and “killing the deep state,” the Trump administration has gutted the National Security Council, State Department and Defense Department of leaders with decades of knowledge regarding the Indo-Pacific. Less spectacular, but as important, the Trump White House has sidelined Washington’s leading think tanks. The Democrats’ new super majority means they can welcome the deans of U.S. foreign policy back into the halls of power. These think tanks have long offered America’s leaders a steady stream of professional connections and sound advice. Elections come and go; foreign policy expertise hums in the background. The new Democrats will therefore turn for guidance to the Brookings Institution, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Council on Foreign Relations, the German Marshall Fund, the Hoover Institution, the Jamestown Foundation and more. Within this network of experts, the new Democrats are also likely to seek contact with the Formosan Association for Public Affairs, the Global Taiwan Institute, Human Rights in China and other friends of Taiwan and critics of the Chinese Communist Party.
Three, alongside the support they can draw from the liberal internationalist think tanks and progressive advocacy groups, the new Democrats will find a Capitol where anger toward China and support for Taiwan stand among the few bipartisan issues, complete with an infrastructure of advocacy. The Congressional-Executive Commission on China, the Congressional Taiwan Caucus, the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, and the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission all serve as quasi-formal entities that hold hearings, produce reports, consult on legislation and more. The new Democrats will find these groups staffed by Republicans who share their concerns about China’s threats against Taiwan. Feeding their fresh energy and electoral mandate into these organizations while working for a moderate foreign policy that prioritizes defending democracies over unilateral deals with dictators, the new Democrats will find colleagues across the aisle dedicated to supporting Taiwan.
Four, the new Democrats will arrive in Washington to find a deep bench of bipartisan legislators who have visited Taipei and who will be eager to support the island by countering China’s aggression. Back in his first administration, President Trump signed into law the Taiwan Travel Act, which encouraged high-level contact between Washington and Taipei. Embodying the bill’s intentions, American legislators have been tramping to Taipei in droves. The Taiwanese president’s website offers a running tally of such guests, with photos full of smiles and handshakes. For Taiwan’s friends, these junkets illustrate American legislators putting boots on the ground, meeting Taiwan’s leaders, enjoying the culture and immersing themselves in the nation’s hopes and dreams. Perhaps most importantly, once they return to Washington from such visits, the new Democrats can turn to a cascade of either stalled-in-committee or implemented-but-forgotten legislation that bodes well for Taiwan. I would especially point to Senator Robert Menendez’s Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act, which was tucked into the National Defense Authorization Act of 2023 and signed into law by President Joe Biden in December 2022. Offering a blueprint for sensible ways to enhance U.S.-Taiwan relations and defend democracy abroad, the bill’s provisions have languished in obscurity, perhaps because Menendez was drummed out of Congress on corruption charges and now sits in prison. But killing the message because of the flawed messenger leads to bad foreign policy. For the new Democrats, returning to the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act would justify taking bold action while invoking an already-approved law, cloaking their actions in a sense of obligation and duty rather than trouble-making. The new Democrats will therefore arrive in Washington to find eager partners and existing legislation awaiting the courage to do right by Taiwan.
China’s “reunification” bombast was not quieted by th e midterms, the carnage in Ukraine drags on, the wars in the Middle East keep slaughtering children, but something shook in America these past weeks. There are no promises in international relations, and Trump’s meetings with Putin and Xi in Shenzhen this week foreshadow danger for the friends of democracy, but our partners in Taiwan should rejoice. You still stand on the frontline, threatened and outgunned by the dictatorship across the strait, but the blue wave suggests your American allies are returning to sanity.








Leave a Reply