Earlier this month, China’s legislature approved a new law aimed at promoting what it refers to as “ethnic unity.” The law’s primary focus is domestic: It mandates the use of Mandarin as the primary medium of education in schools across China, and calls for intermarriage and geographical integration between the Han majority and China’s other 55 recognized ethnicities.
But to the Chinese government, ethnic unity is also a global matter. For decades, the Chinese Communist Party has sought to silence and intimidate members of its global diaspora who are critical of the regime, a practice referred to as transnational repression. Analysts say this new law will codify and extend that effort.
“Organizations and individuals outside the [mainland] territory of the PRC that commit acts aimed at the PRC that undermine ethnic unity and progress or create ethnic division are to be pursued for legal responsibility in accordance with law,” the law reads, referring to the People’s Republic of China by its acronym.
Cases of formal extradition against overseas activists are rare, and usually limited to countries that maintain close ties with China. But the explicit codification can still have a chilling effect, said Emile Dirks, a research associate at the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto who studies transnational repression.
“It serves as a kind of sword of Damocles hanging over people’s heads,” Dirks said. “It’s explicitly written down, a law that is clearly intended to prohibit certain kinds of public activism.”
For members of the Chinese diaspora who are sympathetic to causes that the Chinese government deems as a threat to its interests, he added, the new law makes clear the costs of engaging in such behavior.
Article 21 of the new ethnic unity law strikes a more positive tone. “The state is to strengthen contact and communication with the overseas diaspora and support them in carrying forward Chinese culture and promoting cultural exchanges and cooperation between China and the world,” it reads.
The juxtaposition of positive messaging alongside a more threatening tone maps onto what Dirks described as China’s two-pronged approach to transnational repression. The Chinese Communist Party works to support members of the diaspora who view the regime positively while working to silence those who do not.
Silencing tactics include denying visas for people who would like to travel back to China, as well as using family members who still live there as a cudgel of intimidation, according to Bhuchung Tsering, vice president of the International Campaign for Tibet.
Tsering said that these tactics are part of a larger strategy to constrain the space for discussion around issues facing Tibetan people, including the status of the Dalai Lama. “People outside Tibet, in exile, who talk about China’s abuses of Tibetans, who talk about China’s imposition of Mandarin on Tibetans, can be in theory prosecuted under this law,” he said.
For Chinese citizens who plan to return to China, engaging in activist causes abroad can be even more dangerous.
Last summer, Zhang Yadi (張雅笛), a Chinese student who began writing for a pro-Tibet newsletter while studying abroad, disappeared after returning to China on vacation. She is now believed to be held at a detention center in her hometown of Changsha, facing charges of “inciting separatism.”
Teng Biao (滕彪), a prominent Chinese human rights lawyer, said that even though the Chinese authorities have had the authority to target activists for years, the new law is ultimately aimed at controlling them more efficiently. “It’s true that without written laws, the party can also achieve their goals. But that’s more inconvenient,” he said. “That’s more expensive.”
With a broadly worded law on the books, he said, the courts can feel more confident convicting people who question the regime.
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