The “Taiwan Can Help” campaign during COVID-19 is widely cited as a major diplomacy success for Taiwan. Its provision of large amounts of personal protective equipment, supplemented by consistent messaging and objective internal success in containing the virus, made the value of Taiwan “tangible” to Central and Eastern Europe. In the U.S., opinion polls showed significant rises in support for defense and recognition of Taiwan, members of the Trump Administration were seen wearing masks labeled “made in Taiwan,” and congressional legislation involving Taiwan made reference to Taiwan’s pandemic response.
What this all means is that further health-based diplomacy now presents key opportunities for Taiwan. But the story of “Taiwan Can Help” also demonstrates limits to this potential that should be kept in mind, too.
Messaging
Looking back to 2020, “Taiwan Can Help” messaging was broadcast by Taiwan’s government in a variety of formats. Statements by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on donations of protective equipment, an article in Time Magazine by President Tsai Ing-wen and a speech by Foreign Minister Joseph Wu (吳釗燮) to the Hudson Institute all carried the three-word tagline and core elements of the same sentiment. The “Taiwan model” for handling the pandemic was packaged as democratic good governance alongside emphasizing Taiwan’s difference in approach to China, which it tacitly criticized for a lack of transparency when the virus began to spread.
This messaging was backed up by significant real world achievements. Firstly, Taiwan’s exceptional ability to produce personal protective equipment. By March 2020, Taiwan had become the world’s second-largest producer of surgical masks (behind only China) and began exporting millions of them to countries in need of them. Secondly, its own pandemic response. It kept death rates to levels far below that of many countries, despite its high population density, utilizing (limited) digital surveillance, quarantine of inbound travelers and mask mandates to contain the virus. It also emphasized that all of these decisions operated within the idea of a quick response, informed by Taiwan’s experience with the SARS outbreak in 2003.
Diplomatic Results
Those achievements helped create a platform for successful diplomacy that has followed, albeit this is clearly as a part of other broad trends. “Particularly since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic we have seen a window of opportunity for expansion of Taiwan Europe ties,” said Marcin Jerzewski, head of the Taiwan Office at the European Values Center for Security Policy. He was speaking at their recent forum event and referring to increasing diplomatic, economic and educational exchanges.
There was also success to be found in cultivating a clear contrast to China’s more authoritarian approach to handling the pandemic, and — rightly or wrongly — in emphasizing that China was the origin of the virus. “During [the] COVID period when China became a globally resented object … we found that we have some friends in Europe,” Yu Ching-hsin (游清鑫), director and distinguished research fellow of the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University, said at same forum event as Jerzewski. China’s reputation took hits among various populations and that provided an opportunity for Taiwan to step into, most notably with the provision of large amounts of surgical masks, but also with its own story of good — democratic — governance in dealing with the pandemic.
The fruits of that experience are still being borne. Over the past year, Taiwan has signed memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with the Czech Republic, the United Kingdom and Canada regarding healthcare. Described by the Global Taiwan Brief journal as “strategic steps toward making Taiwan a globally recognized player in health and medical innovation,” these MOUs demonstrate a clear, upward trajectory for Taiwan’s reputation in healthcare that can’t be separated from the starting point of the COVID-19 pandemic: the U.K. MOU specifically focuses on “pandemic preparedness.”
Limitations
However, what this does not mean is that “Taiwan Can Help” can be counted as a categorical success. The campaign also came with disappointments and limitations.
Most notably, from the beginning, the campaign notably centered around Taiwan being able to participate in World Health Organization meetings, and this did not happen. The embarrassing incident whereby the WHO assistant director-general dropped off a call in an apparent attempt to avoid questions about Taiwan piled pressure on the organization. International support did come in for Taiwan’s bid. But there was not a tangible outcome. And this was not all.
A second disappointment is less well covered. As new research published in the Contemporary Politics journal has shown, while Taiwan’s narrative of pandemic success was taken up in the U.S., the specific details of the “Taiwan model” were looked past. Speeches by key government figures such as U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo “stress[ed] that Taiwan is ‘democratic’ and contained the virus without resorting to China’s ‘drastic’ or ‘draconian’ measures” but elided what could be learned from the “Taiwan model.” Thus, to some extent it remained the case that Taiwan was defined either in opposition to China or as sharing values with the U.S, rather than as an equal partner.
Finally, as a demonstration of the vulnerability of Taiwan’s position, there is the story of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s brief expression of gratitude following “Taiwan Can Help” and how quickly things changed afterwards, told by Marcin Jerzewski.
“You may remember that shortly after the COVID-19 pandemic started to rage across Europe, Taiwan — under its hashtag ‘Taiwan Can Help’ — sent a lot of sorely needed personal protective equipment items to Europe including face masks, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen then thanked Taiwan by mentioning it by name. It was a very explicit statement on her Twitter. [But] the following day the second execution under the Tsai Administration took place, which of course resulted in a statement from the spokesperson of the European External Action Service and very much undermined Taiwan’s potential role as a normative power and like-minded partner of the European Union.”
With these examples in mind, it’s reasonable to say “Taiwan Can Help” brought tangible diplomatic successes for Taiwan and continues to do so. But it didn’t suddenly change the structure of the world. Rather, it should be seen as one notably useful injection into a world of powerful, pre-existing narratives.
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