Donald Trump’s foreign policy convictions — that U.S. allies and partners are free riders that do not contribute enough for their defense, that the outsized role the United States has played since the end of World War II does not benefit the country and that the global trading system disadvantages the United States — are easy to dismiss as an aberration that will disappear when Trump leaves the political scene.
But doing so would be a mistake. Although Trump expresses these views in an unvarnished way — and his proposed solutions might be fanciful — he is reflecting both the growing isolationism and deepening skepticism of free trade in the United States.
The stark choices that could well face U.S. allies and partners if Trump returns to the White House in January 2025 may be most acute on his watch but will likely exist regardless of the outcome of the election. Taiwan, though not a formal U.S. ally, faces an even tougher challenge — it cannot turn to any country other than the United States for its security, it cannot deter Chinese aggression alone and deferring to China would, by definition, mean the end of its autonomy.
When Trump left office in 2021, Taiwanese officials and citizens were broadly happy with his policies towards the island. On Trump’s watch, arms sales to Taiwan and U.S. Navy patrols in the Taiwan Strait increased, while high-level visits by U.S. officials were undertaken. Signaling appreciation for these steps, President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) declared toward the end of the Trump administration that U.S.-Taiwan relations “have never been better.” In one survey, Taiwan was the only place in the Indo-Pacific that preferred Trump over Biden in the 2020 election.
Yet such sentiment has shifted. U.S. President Joe Biden declared four times that he would defend the island and has continued to strengthen U.S.-Taiwan ties. Trump, by contrast, voiced skepticism about defending Taiwan and blamed it for taking the United States’ semiconductor manufacturing industry. He reportedly doubted whether the United States could even defend Taiwan if it wanted to. In a July 2024 poll taken just before Biden withdrew from the presidential race, Taiwanese respondents preferred Biden over Trump.
If Trump wins a second term, he would likely pressure Taiwan to rapidly increase its defense budget. While Taiwan spends roughly 2.5 percent of its GDP on defense and has nearly doubled its defense budget over the past decade, Trump has stated that Taiwan should spend 10 percent of GDP on defense. Relatedly, while the Biden administration has provided Taiwan with $900 million in military aid since 2022, Trump’s resentment that “Taiwan doesn’t give us anything” could also prompt his administration to halt such aid on the basis that Taiwan should pay for U.S. military hardware.
While Taiwan is a top 10 trading partner of the United States and plays a critical role in global supply chains, Trump focuses on the bilateral trade balance, viewing it as the best proxy for the fairness of an economic relationship. In 2023, the United States had a bilateral trade deficit of $48 billion with Taiwan. Trump could choose to pressure Taiwan to reduce its trade surplus with the United States by purchasing U.S. goods in bulk or allowing its currency to appreciate.
One area where there could be continuity between the Biden administration and a second Trump administration concerns efforts to onshore semiconductor manufacturing. Through the bipartisan CHIPS and Science Act, the Biden administration is allocating nearly $53 billion to expand chip production in the United States and has already awarded the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company $6.6 billion to establish a foundry in Arizona. Trump could seek to accelerate U.S. chip production by loosening regulations and streamlining permitting.
A second Trump term would also raise more fundamental questions for Taiwan. Taiwan’s leaders have embraced President Biden’s framing of this era as “a battle between democracy and autocracy,” arguing that Taiwan stands on the frontlines of that struggle. But this argument is unlikely to move Trump.
Taiwan has also drawn a linkage between Ukraine’s fate and its own, with its former Representative to the United States and current vice president arguing that “Ukraine’s success in defending against aggression is so important also for Taiwan.” Yet many Republicans aligned with Trump believe this demonstrates Taiwan is not addressing the threat that it faces from China with sufficient urgency, and should instead support their calls for the United States to prioritize China over Europe.
To head this off, Taiwan would want to take several steps — above all, conveying that it is taking its defense seriously. Setting a goal of spending 5 percent of GDP on defense and annually increasing its defense budget would be welcomed regardless of who next occupies the Oval Office. Taiwan and the United States could also partner on the development and production of weapons systems, such as drones. Both Republicans and Democrats support onshoring, and additional investments by Taiwanese companies in the United States would further demonstrate the value of strong U.S.-Taiwan relations.
While no other country is willing or able to assume the role that the United States has traditionally played in Taiwan’s defense, Taipei could strengthen its security partnership with Japan. Such a step should be taken regardless of who wins the November election and would help Taiwan hedge against a United States that may turn inward or grow more unpredictable.
China, for its part, may well read Trump’s statements and conclude that the United States would not defend Taiwan or push back against Chinese attempts to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. It would then likely intensify its campaign of military, economic and political pressure, further destabilizing the region. U.S. allies, above all Japan and South Korea, would likely become unnerved at U.S. inaction and wonder whether they can rely on Washington for their security.
The situation that Taiwan faces, while unique in a sense, also applies to other U.S. partners. They will need to contend with an increasingly capable and aggressive China and rising isolationism and protectionism in the United States. Trump’s foreign policy pronouncements reflect sentiments held by many in the United States, and similar dynamics may arise regardless of who wins the upcoming election.
David Sacks is Fellow for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he focuses on U.S.-China relations, U.S.-Taiwan relations and Chinese foreign policy.
This article is republished from East Asia Forum under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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